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Abstract 
We investigated the endogenous choice of roles by managerial firms in the presence of unilateral 
externality. The choice over timing can be taken either by managers or by owners. It is shown that (i) the 
choice of the timing by managers entails the same profit that owners would have achieved by specifying 
the timing in the delegation contract; and (ii) firms move simultaneously if the degree of unilateral 
externality is small, while sequentially if the degree of unilateral externality is large, with the firm 
generating unilateral externality as a follower; the owner of the follower firm delegates to restrict output, 
while his/her counterpart does not delegate it.   
JEL: D43, L13, M21 
Keywords:  Managerial Delegation, Externality, Stackelberg, Endogenous Timing. 
1 Introduction 
In their pioneering paper, Hamilton and Slutsky (1990) investigated the issue of endogenous 
timing by adding a preplay stage at which players decide simultaneously whether to move at the 
first opportunity or at the second. Based on the framework of Hamilton and Slutsky (1990) with 
one production period, a variety of strategic settings has emerged. 
  
 We introduce unilateral externality into the demand function
1 and investigate the endogenous 
role choices of managerial firms. In the case of unilateral externality, when one firm is affected 
                                                            
 Kangsik Choi benefited from discussant  Hyung Bae and  participants for their valuable comments  in   Applied 
Economics Seminar at Korea Foundation for Advanced Studies. 
1 Theoretical studies that introduce exogenous asymmetry into oligopoly market include Albaek (1990), Mailath (19
93),  Amir and Grilo (1999),  Amir (1995),  Robson (1990),  Gal-
 Or (1985), Dowrick (1986) and Boyer and Moreaux (1987), among others. 
  1by the actions of other firms, the former may simply not react because of the positive externality 
generated by the latter. For instance, many instances of unilateral externality, in which a minor 
firm is affected by a major one, mark the recent history of corporate interaction. Suppose that 
two firms, one relatively smaller than the other, produce goods. The major firm has the resources 
to advertise and expand its market, whereas its minor rival lacks them. For this reason, the 
smaller of the two competitors has a greater chance of selling its output because of the positive 
externality generated by the major firm
2. This situation occurs, for example, in an appliance store 
where the products of household appliance manufacturers that are not particularly prominent are 
displayed alongside those of established, prominent brands. As another example, consider a type 
of DVD player that is already sold by several prominent brands. In this instance, the market 
channel may be exploited by a fringe firm, since the network size of the famous trademarks is 
larger than its own. The fringe DVD manufacturer may have either a greater or a lesser chance of 
selling its output as a result of the positive or negative externality generated by the better known 
brands. Borrowing the phraseology of Tirole (1988, Chapter 10), positive externality arises when 
a good is so valuable to consumers that they adopt compatible goods. Thus, a popular automobile 
is serviced by many dealers, and an unfashionable one, by specific dealers. The size of the 
relevant good may be industry-wide
3.  However, we focus on unilateral externality. 
 
In our model, the products are perfect substitutes if the unilateral externality is absent.
4 When 
the unilateral externality is present, the quantity of one firm (say firm 1)’s product has an 
additional price-raising effect on the other firm (say, firm 2)’s product besides the normal price-
reducing effect. Only one firm’s product has this price-raising effect and so we call it unilateral 
externality. When the degree of the unilateral externality is sufficiently large, firm 1’s product 
becomes a complement to firm 2’s while it is still a substitute when the degree of the unilateral 
externality is sufficiently small. For this reason, firms would be concerned about the presence of 
the externality. Cabral and Majure's (1994) theoretical and empirical study of Portuguese 
banking presents some relevant evidence. They find that in the case of some banks, the number 
of branches of rivals is a strategic complement, while for other banks, it is a strategic substitute. 
This finding is explained by the geographic differences in the expansion patterns of 
incumbent/public banks and entrant/private banks, stemming from dissimilarities in their relative 
efficiency (private banks being relatively more efficient in urban areas) and the degrees of 
customer loyalty (rural customers being more loyal than urban ones). 
 
On the other hand, it is well known that such a situation can arise in standard models without 
the externality. For example, Bulow et al. (1985a, 1985b) suggest several instances in which 
possible strategic asymmetries exist. One example is the following: the dominant firm in the 
industry may regard its rivals' outputs as strategic complements, while a fringe firm may regard 
those of the dominant firm as strategic substitutes. A more recent paper by Tombak (2006) 
presents further examples and a discussion of strategic asymmetry
5. In these works on strategic 
                                                            
2 Later, we will mention in the Model section why we treat only the positive externality. This is inspired by the work
 of Nakamura (2006) who just pointed out externality regarding demand functions. 
3 These examples are related to the influence of network externality. 
4 The products can be differentiated. However, the analysis would be same and the results would not change qualitati
vely.  
5 Tombak (2006) showed that the recommendation of strategy for an accommodating incumbent differs from that 
suggested by Fudenberg and Tirole (1984) when one firm regards rival’s output as a strategic substitute while its 
  2asymmetry, the leader is determined exogenously by the incumbent firm's investment in the first 
stage. However, we focus on the endogenous choice of roles in the presence of unilateral 
externality.  
 
 We examine the contract a la Vickers (1985), Fershtman and Judd (1987) and Sklivas (1987), 
hereafter referred to as VFJS. VFJS showed that when firms delegate the output decision to the 
manager, the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium results in an output that is higher and in profits 
that are lower than those that can be observed in the Cournot game
6. The existing related 
literature, however, does not discuss the effect of unilateral externality on delegation with firm’s 
moves of order endogenously determined. This study considers the effect on a managerial 
delegation game when unilateral externality exists across firms. We adopt the generalization of 
Hamilton and Slutsky's (1990) observable delay game and introduce the descriptions of the 
delegation game of Vickers (1985) and Lambertini (2000a)
7. In this regard, Lambertini (2000a) 
extends the delegation game to model explicitly the timing choices made by managers or firm 
owners
8. He demonstrates that when firms compete in quantities, the simultaneous-move game 
occurs endogenously. If the choice of timing is delegated to the managers, they will play at the 
first opportunity. On the contrary, if the choice of timing is not delegated, the owners prefer the 
second opportunity. Observationally, these two cases have the same subgame perfect Nash 
equilibrium. This feature arises because each owner of the follower firm has the advantage of 
being able to increase output using delegation while the owner of the leader does not delegate it. 
This leads to a situation in which all firms first decide to delay and then to delegate control to the 
managers. Thus, all firms play the simultaneous-move game at the second opportunity. 
 
 Following Lambertini  (2000a, b), we consider a three-stage game model, which focuses on 
the issue of endogenous timing with strategic delegation in the presence of unilateral externality. 
This paper shows that when managers are only delegated the market decision, with the choice of 
timing remaining with the stockholders, the extended game with observable delay exhibits 
observationally the same subgame perfect Nash equilibrium as the one in which both decisions 
are delegated to managers.  This result is the same as that of Lambertini (2000a), in the sense that, 
in his setting, the subgame perfect Nash equilibriums of the two cases are also observationally 
identical. However, the difference is also worth noting. In Lambertini (2000a), firms move 
simultaneously in the Cournot setting in equilibrium. This is the same as our result when the 
degree of unilateral externality is sufficiently small, since the products produced by the two firms 
are substitutes.  However, when the degree of unilateral externality is sufficiently large such that 
the product of the firm that generates the unilateral externality becomes a complement to the 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
rival firm regards the dominant firm’s outputs as strategic complement. 
6 Furthermore, Ritz (2008) and  Jansen et al. (2007) analyzed a case in which the managers' objective function is a 
weighted sum of the firm's profit and market share. Miller and Pazgal (2002) adopted a case in which the manager's 
objective function is a weighted sum of the firm's profit and the profits of its rivals. For the extension of this game, 
see also Witteloostuijn et al.(2007),  Manasakis et al. (2007),  Ishibashi (2001) and Theilen (2007). 
7 For the sake of simplicity, our framework of managers' objective functions differs from that analyzed by Jansen et 
al. (2007), because the introduction of market share in the contracts complicated the mathematical methodology in 
comparison with the sale volume contracts.  
8  On the other hand, Lambertini (2000b) extends the delegation game to explicitly model the timing choices made b
y only owners of firms while the output decision is delegated to the manager. It is worth noting that in Lambertini (2
000b) the decision upon the timing of order is up to
 the owner, while its implementation at market stage is delegated to the manager. 
  3rival firm, the equilibrium requires sequentiality with the firm generating unilateral externality as 
a follower; the owner of the firm delegates to restrict output, while his/her counterpart in the 
other firm does not delegate it.  
  
The organization of the paper is as follows. In Section 2, we describe the model. Section 3 
presents equilibrium analysis in fixed timing under duopoly. Section 4 determines firms' 
endogenous choice of timing. Section 5 closes the paper. 
 
2. The Model  
We consider an asymmetric duopolistic model with unilateral externality. The products are 
perfect substitutes if the unilateral externality is absent. When the unilateral externality is present, 
the quantity of firm 1’s product has an additional price-raising effect on firm 2’s product besides 
the normal price-reducing effect. Only firm 1’s product has this price-raising effect and so we 
call it unilateral externality. The inverse demands of firms 1 and 2 are characterized as 
 
                                                               , 2 1 1 q q a p                                                                      (1) 
, ) 1 ( 2 1 2 q q a p                                                                (2) 
where  is the market price of good  　 i and  　 denotes the output of fi 　 rmi (= 1 　 , 2) 　 , i p i q   
measures the degree of unilateral externality,  1 ); 2 , 0 (     .
9 When the degree of the unilateral 
externality is sufficiently large, i.e.,    1, 2   , firm 1’s product becomes a complement to firm 
2’s while it is still a substitute when the degree of the unilateral externality is sufficiently small, 
i.e.,  .   1  0, 
Firms' owners may decide whether to delegate control to managers. The protocol described by 
Vickers (1985) is followed in order to formalize managerial delegation
10. Each owner can assess 
the performance of his/her manager in accordance with two readily observable indicators, 
namely, the profit and output of the firm. The cost of writing a contract is assumed to be fixed, 
which is normalized to zero with no loss of generality. Let firm i’s production cost function be 
, where  () ii i Cq f c q  i i f is a fixed cost  and    is a constant marginal cost. For simplicity, we 
assume that  and   with no loss of generality. As for firm 1’s fixed cost 
i c
2 f  0 12 0 cc  1 f , since 
firm 1 generates unilateral externality, we can assume it is positive. However, as long as it is 
                                                            
9 We thank referees for suggesting this range of unilateral externality. Moreover, if  1   , then the price of firm 2’s 
product is independent of firm 1’s quantity. This is not an interesting case. 
10 Fershtman and Judd (1987) defined the manager's objective function as related to a linear combination of profit 
and revenue. For the sake of simplicity, we adopt Vickers'  approach. 
  4sufficiently small, it does not affect our analysis
11. So we also assume . Thus, we assume 
that the manager of firm   maximizes the function 
1 0 f 
i
                                                                                                 (3)  i i i i i i i i q q p q U       
where the parameter  i   identifies the weight attached to the volume of sales and   is the profit 
of firm  's owner.  
i 
i
We consider the issue of endogenous timing with strategic delegation in the presence of 
unilateral externality. Two cases are distinguished: (i) Both timing and market decisions are 
delegated to managers; (ii) Only the market decision is delegated to managers, while the choice 
of timing remains in the hands of stockholders. Specifically, a three-stage game model is used. 
The timing of the game is as follows. For case (i), in the first stage, each owner writes his or her 
manager's incentive contract, in which the manager's objective function is specified, and we call 
it the contract stage. In the second stage, the managers of the firms announce simultaneously the 
period in which output is to be produced, knowing each other's incentive contract; this is called 
the announcement stage. In the third stage, each manager produces outputs in the announced 
period, with knowledge of each other's incentive contract and production period; this is referred 
to as the market stage. If both managers decide to produce simultaneously (respectively, in 
different periods), a Cournot-type (respectively, a Stackelberg-type) game arises. For case (ii), 
we still have a three-stage game. The first stage is the announcement stage in which it is the 
owners instead of managers who make the announcement of the production period (or each 
owner specifies the timing in the contract). The second is the contract stage, and the third is the 
market stage. 
3 Equilibrium Analysis in Fixed Timing 
Before presenting the results of equilibrium derived from the model with the observable delay 
game, we present the equilibrium analysis in fixed timing, namely, (1) when the managers of 
firms compete simultaneously in the market stage (i.e., Cournot-type), and (2) when they take 
their output decisions sequentially in the market stage (i.e., Stackelberg-type). We will use 
superscript “c” to denote the Cournot case, “l” to denote the leader, and “f” to denote the 
follower. 
[Cournot-type]:  In the market stage, the manager of firm i maximizes his payoff   by 
choosing quantity   and both managers choose quantities simultaneously. Thus, both managers’ 
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11 We thank referees for suggesting this intuitive explanation of the assumption. 
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.                                         (10) 
Given the market stage, the owners of both firms simultaneously select their delegation 
parameters in order to maximize their objectives during the contract stage. Then each firm's 
profit maximization problem in the contract stage is to maximize  i   by choosing i  . 
The first-order conditions for firmi are: 
2
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When firms move simultaneously, each    can be either a positive or a negative value 
c
i 
  6depending on the value of  . Thus, in contrast with the results reported by Vickers (1985) and 
Fershtman and Judd (1987), delegation can be utilized to restrict output (respectively, expand) 
output if  ) 2 , 1 (   (respectively, ) 1 , 0 (   ). Therefore, if  ) 2 , 1 (    (respectively,  ) 1 , 0 (   ), 
owners are able to commit themselves and ensure defensive (respectively, offensive) behavior 
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[Stackelberg-type 1]: Let us consider the Stackelberg game in which the manager of firm 1 is 
the leader. To solve for the backwards-induction quantity of this game, we use the manager of 
firm 2's managerial reaction function (5) as in the simultaneous-move games. Hence, the 
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 Straightforward computation yields each firm's equilibrium quantity: 
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It follows that 
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Each firm's profit maximization problem in the contract stage is to maximize   by choosing i  i  . 











.                                                 (20) 
Firm 1 functions as the leader and decides that it is optimal not to allow for any output   
expansion and restriction, whereas firm 2 functions as the follower, and uses the delegation to 
restrict (respectively, expand) output if  ) 2 , 1 (    (respectively,  ) 1 , 0 (   ).  Both firms' quantities 
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 [Stackelberg-type 2]: Finally, consider the game in which the manager of firm 2 functions as 
the leader. Similar to the previous Stackelberg game, we utilize the manager of firm 1's 
managerial reaction function (4) as in the simultaneous-move games. Hence, the manager of firm 
2 selects the output to maximize 
.
2 2
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Each firm's profit maximization problem in the contract stage is to maximize   by choosing i  i  . 
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Firm 1 acts as the follower and uses the delegation to restrict (respectively, expand) output if 
) 2 , 1 (    (respectively,  ) 1 , 0 (   ),  whereas firm 2 functions as the leader, and decides that it is 
optimal not to allow for any output expansion and restriction.  Both firms' quantities and payoffs 
are then  
2
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4. The Choice of Timing  
4.1 Delegation of Both Decisions 
Having derived the equilibrium for three fixed timing games in the previous section, we will 
investigate the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE) of the entire game for case (i), namely, 
when both timing and market decisions are delegated to managers. The reduced form of 
endogenous timing game can be represented by payoff table 1. In the table, “F” and “S” 
represent the first period and second period with regard to quantity choice, respectively. 
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These inequalities tell us that firm 1 prefers producing sequentially (respectively, in the first 
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.                                                            (33) 
These inequalities tell us that firm 2 prefers producing in the first opportunity.  So there is a 
unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in the observable delay game of managerial delegation: 
Firm 1 acts as a follower, i.e., (S, F) if  ) 2 , 1 (    while both firms move in the first opportunity, 
i.e., (F, F) if  ) 1 , 0 (   . Thus, we have the following proposition: 
 
Proposition 1:  When both decisions are delegated to managers, under the assumption of 
unilateral externality with  ) 2 , 0 (   , there is a unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. If 
) 1 , 0 (   , the equilibrium involves both firms moving in the first opportunity; on the contrary,  if 
) 2 , 1 (   , it involves firm 2 producing as a leader while the firm generating externality, i.e.,  
firm 1, as a follower. 
 
The fact that producing in the first opportunity is the manager of firm 2’s strictly dominant 
strategy plays an important role in the derivation of the result. Since it is the managers who are 
making decisions of timing, clearly, being a leader is always better than moving simultaneously. 
                                                            
12 From (6), we know that  12 20 a      and that    12 [( 1 ) 1 2 0 a        . 
  10Hence,   and  . If the manager of firm 1 chooses to produce in the first period, the 
manager of firm 2 prefers moving simultaneous to being a follower. Suppose the manager of 
firm 2 produces as a follower. Anticipating this, if 
2






) 2 , 1 (   , firm 1 produces few outputs so that 
firm 2, as a follower, will not produce too many outputs (recall that firm 2’s reaction function is 
upward if  ) 2 , 1 (   ) and the price of firm 1’s product will not be too low; if  ) 1 , 0 (   , firm 1 
produces many outputs so that firm 2, as a follower, will produce few outputs (recall that firm 
2’s reaction function is downward if  ) 1 , 0 (   ). On the contrary, if firm 2 produces 
simultaneously with firm 1 in period 1, firm 2 produces more, yielding more payoff to the 
manager of firm 2. Hence,  . We find that firm 2 wants to produce in the first 
opportunity regardless of in which period firm 1 produces. 
2
c UU  2
f
Given producing in period 1 is the manager of firm 2’s strictly dominant strategy, the manager 
of firm 1 chooses to produce in period 2 as a follower if  ) 2 , 1 (   , i.e.,  if the degree of unilateral 
externality from firm 1 to firm 2 is sufficiently large so that firm 1’s product becomes a 
complement to firm 2’s product. Suppose firm 1 produces in period 2. Anticipating this firm 2 
produces few outputs so that firm 1 can produce many outputs (recall that firm 1’s reaction 
function is downward) and the price of firm 2’s product will be high. If firm 1 produces 
simultaneously with firm 2 in period 1, firm 1 produces less, yielding lower payoff to the 
manager of firm 1. Hence,  11
f c UU 
) 1 , 0 ( 
. Thus, the unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium stated 
in Proposition 1 obtains. If  , i.e., if the degree of unilateral externality from firm 1 to 
firm 2 is sufficiently small so that firm 1’s product is still a substitute to firm 2’s product, the 
standard result remains hold, i.e., producing in the first opportunity is a strictly dominant strategy 
for both firms and thus both firms producing in the first period is a strictly dominant strategy 
equilibrium, the same as in Lambertini (2000a). 
4.2 Delegation of Only the Market Decision 
Similar to previous subsection, we will investigate the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of case 
(ii), namely, when only the market decision is delegated to managers, while the choice of timing 
remains in the hands of stockholders. The reduced form of endogenous timing game can be 
represented by payoff table 2. In the table, “F” and “S” represent the first period and second 
period with regard to quantity choice, respectively.  
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f l
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To find subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, we need to compare profits. Straightforward 
computation shows that 
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So there is a unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in the observable delay game of 
managerial delegation: Firm 1 functions as a follower, i.e., (S,F) if  ) 2 , 1 (   , while both firms 
move in the second opportunity, i.e., (S, S) if  ) 1 , 0 (   . Thus, we have the following proposition: 
 
Proposition 2:  When managers are being delegated only the market decision, under the 
assumption of unilateral externality with  ) 2 , 0 (   , there is a unique subgame perfect Nash 
equilibrium. If  ) 1 , 0 (   , the equilibrium involves both firms moving in the second opportunity; 
on the contrary,  if  ) 2 , 1 (   , it involves firm 2 producing as a leader while the firm generating 
externality, i.e.,  firm 1, as a follower. 
 
The fact that producing in the second opportunity is the owner of firm 1’s strictly dominant 
strategy plays an important role in the derivation of the result. It is well known that the owner of 
the leading firm prefers not to delegate (i.e., 0
l   ). Lambertini (2000a) finds that the owner of 
each firm prefers moving in the second opportunity in the Cournot setting when products are 
substitutes since it is profitable for the owner to use the delegation device to shift his/her own 
  12reaction function outwards ( ). Hence, in our model, if  0
f   ) 1 , 0 (   , i.e., if the degree of 
unilateral externality from firm 1 to firm 2 is sufficiently small so that firm 1’s product is still a 
substitute to firm 2’s product, we find the unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in which 
both firms move in the second opportunity. The new finding is that even if  ) 2 , 1 (   , i.e.,  if the 
degree of unilateral externality from firm 1 to firm 2 is sufficiently large so that firm 1’s product 
becomes a complement to firm 2’s product, firm 1 still prefers moving in the second opportunity. 
The reason is the following: if  ) 2 , 1 (   , then firm 1’s product becomes a complement to firm 
2’s product, and the owner of firm 1 wants to restrict its output so that firm 2 does not produce 
too many outputs (recall that firm 2’s reaction function is upward). Hence, the owner of firm 1 
wants to use the delegation device to shift his/her own reaction function inwards ( ).   0
f  
Given producing in period 2 is the owner of firm 1’s strictly dominant strategy, the owner of 
firm 2 chooses to produce in period 1 as a leader if  ) 2 , 1 (   . Since firm 1 chooses to restrict its 
output in the second opportunity if  ) 2 , 1 (   , firm 2 chooses to be a leader so that it can produce 
more output and earn more profit. Thus, we get the unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium 
stated in Proposition 2.  
 
From Propositions 1 and 2, we immediately have the following corollary. 
 
Corollary 1: When managers are being delegated only the market decision, while the choice of 
timing remains in the stockholders’ hands, the extended game with observable delay 
observationally exhibits the same subgame perfect  Nash equilibrium as the one when both 
decisions are delegated to managers. Namely, firms move simultaneously if  ) 1 , 0 (    while 
sequentially if  ) 2 , 1 (    with firm 1 generating unilateral externality as a follower. 
 
The corollary seems the same as Proposition 1 in Lambertini (2000a), who analyzed the case of 
substitutes, in the sense that the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium is observationally the same 
when managers are being delegated only the market decision as when both decisions are 
delegated to managers. However, the difference is also worth noting. In Lambertini (2000a), 
firms move simultaneously in the Cournot setting in equilibrium. This is the same as our result 
when ) 1 , 0 (   , since the products produced by the two firms are substitutes. However, when 
) 2 , 1 (   , equilibrium requires sequentiality with firm 1 generating unilateral externality as a 
follower. 
 
5. Concluding Remarks  
This study investigated the endogenous choice of roles by managerial firms, under the 
assumption that there exists an asymmetric circumstance of unilateral externality. In our setting, 
the products produced by two firms are originally perfect substitutes. However, besides the 
normal price-reducing effect, the quantity of firm 1’s product has an additional price-raising 
effect on the price of firm 2’s product. This is what we called unilateral externality. The main 
finding is that, when managers are being delegated only the market decision, while the choice of 
  13timing remains in the stockholders’ hands, the extended game with observable delay 
observationally exhibits the same subgame perfect Nash equilibrium as the one when both 
decisions are delegated to managers. Namely, firms move simultaneously if the degree of 
unilateral externality is small, i.e., ) 1 , 0 (   , while sequentially if the degree of unilateral 
externality is large, i.e., ) 2 , 1 (   , with firm 1 generating unilateral externality as a follower. This 
finding seems the same as Proposition 1 in Lambertini (2000a), who analyzed the case of 
substitutes, in the sense that the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium is observationally the same 
when managers are being delegated only the market decision as when both decisions are 
delegated to managers. However, we should note that only when  ) 1 , 0 (   , the equilibrium 
outcome is the same as in Lambertini (2000a): firms move simultaneously in equilibrium. On the 
contrary, when  ) 2 , 1 (   , equilibrium requires sequentiality. So the degree of unilateral 
externality plays an important role in firms’ choice of roles. 
However, this study has its limitations. For example, with the externality across firms, our 
findings differ from those observed when the managers' objective function is a weighted sum of 
the firm's profit and market share, as in the study of Jansen et al. (2007). Future studies in this 
field will require a comprehensive analysis of strategic variables, including managers' objective 
functions
13. The precise details of the managerial delegation structure and the choice of strategic 
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